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THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF CRIMINOLOGY
Marianne W. Beth"
Social sciences have reached a point
of development where their investigations into socially undesirable and prohibited behavior should be liberated
from the fetters of juridical positivism.
Of course, a criminal is primarily and
distinctly a person who has been found
guilty by a criminal court of a definite
act or omission that is outlawed by
law or statute. But it does not follow
that criminology must limit its research
to such behavior or to that distinct
group of people. Already the Italian
scientist Garofalo, who coined the
word "criminology" in his work Criminologia (first edition 1885) advised its
use in the narrower juridical sense and
in a broader sociological sense. This
wise advice is still appropriate for our
age that has come to learn that objective criminal behavior does not always
result in a societal reaction of a given
pattern, or that a given societal reaction allows for conclusions concerning
a definite action evoking it. Criminology tends thus to become the "science
of undesirable social behavior" and of
societal reactions to such behavior.
This problem recently has been discussed more widely, since Sutherland
directed the attention of scientists
toward the fact that socially harmful
and highly undesirable behavior of

tainly enough significance in social attitudes to make social- sanctions as important a test of criminality as law and
social damage." Further it would be
difficult for the scientists to adjust their
teaching or their researches to a
changed definition. "As a matter of
practice there is a very considerable
body of research, conclusions, and theory, admittedly valid for the ordinary
sort of underworld and underprivileged
character, which would have to be almost hopelessly incumbered with qualifying reserves if we are to include large
portions of the medical, legal, banking,
and other professions in the criminal
classes."

I Ph.D., LL.D., Lecturer on Sociology, Reed
College, Portland, Ore.
2Edwin A. Sutherland, "White Collar Criminality," American Sociological Review, V. (1940)
1-12.

3 Courtland, C. Van Vechten, "The Toleration
Quotient as a Device for Defining Certain Social
Concepts." The American Journal of Sociology,
XLVI (1940), July, p. 35-43.

certain types (white collar crime) was
not dealt with by the criminal courts,
but by boards, magistrates, or other
authorities. Sutherland insists that such
a differentiation of societal repressive
reaction does not alter the fact that these
acts are sociologically to be regarded
es crimes, and that these patterns of
behavior are to be included in the
science of criminal psychology and
criminology in general, although they
are not part of the criminological official statistics.
Van Vechten, however, took exception to this suggestion.3 He stated that
"on theoretical grounds there is cer-
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Van Vechten's positive contribution
to the explanation of the phenomenon
of differential societal reaction against
different types of prohibited social behavior is the introduction of the notion
of Social Tolerance and of the concept
of "toleration quotient," based on the
social status of the person involved.
"To express the relationship between
objective behavior .and social status the
concept of the "toleration quotient" is
suggested. This would be a fraction of
which the numerator would be the objective behavior and the denominator
the measure of the community tolerance
for the particular type of behavior on
the part of members of the class to
which the person concerned belongs,
plus some individual factors. When the
numerator exceeds the denominator
formal and official action takes place;
the seriousness of the action having some
relation to the degree of excess. For
4uotients less than unity, social pressure short of official action, but still
somewhat proportional to the value of
the quotient, are brought to bear."
But this concept explains very few
of the relevant problems. Is social
toleration primarily connected with
status? Does the problem, which Sutherland has started, imply that the man
of high social status can get away with
murder or theft, that is with that type
of "objective behavior," which would
be repressed by "formal and official
action," if perpetrated by a member of
the underprivileged classes? That may
happen. But Sutherland's "white collar
crime" was typically behavior of a pattern which is obviously inaccessible to
the underprivileged classes. And the
"toleration" applies generally to this
pattern of behavior, and not to the
status of the perpetrator, at least not
in the first line.

In raising these questions, the investigator is nevertheless confronted with
the fact that societal repression is not
exclusively determined by the intensity of social harmfulness of a pattern
of behavior, but that other important
factors enter into the pattern of reaction. These factors are obviously manyfold, and many of them are consciously
or subconsciously concealed from general knowledge, because since times immemorial the ideal of impartial, that is
of mechanically equal justice, has been
upheld. This ideal, however, never prevailed in absolute and unqualified form,
not even in theory, except during the
short period of Beccaria's influence on
continental European legislation. And
even then, there were remarkable distinctions to be observed, just those distinctions which have excited Sutherland's attention.
One of the guiding ideas of societal
reaction seems to be a moderation in
employing repressive action. This moderation disappears at times. For instance, the excessive use of capital punishment during the 18th century may
easily induce the opposite conclusion,
namely that the social repressive apparatus always tends towards a maximum of officiousness. Still, in balanced
times, the other tendency is clearly
observable. The last decades have seen
it at work in institutions like probation
and even parole; in all the social services complementing and even replacing
social repression for- the underprivileged classes. Moderation tends to appear as "toleration" in its initial stages.
What looks like "toleration" may be
social weakness. Caesar tells of the
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Gallic nobles, who appeared before
their informers with an enormous retinue, thus demonstrating that the execution of an unfavorable judgment
against them would be hardly feasible.
A similar situation of general social
weakness or disintegration causes the
toleration of gansterism, but hardly a
regard for their status as members of
a privileged class. The fact exists that
society as an organized unit is not always mightier than some individuals
or groups. Society does not tolerate
these groups, but it must submit to
them until it gains sufficient strength
to deal with them.
There are obviously also cases, where
Van Vechten's explanation holds good.
There are individuals in every society
who seem so important for the general welfare that society does not want
to interfere with their activity, even
if single acts are undesirable. Unforgettable is the damage done by social
repression in the cases of Lord Byron
and Oscar Wilde. But such social opportunism is bound up with personalits, not generally with status. It is
based on the fundamental insight that
there is hardly such a thing as objective
behavior, but that the consequences
of each act vary according to the circumstances.
In other cases, for instance in the
case of delinquent children of well-todo parents, social interference may
seem unnecessary, on the objective side,
because the social harm has been
amended by the parents, and because,

subjectively, educational measures may
be taken by the family.

4 It is theoretically assumed, such destruction
vould take place only in case of capital punishment. But actually it can hardly be avoided,
except in unusually favorable circumstances,

when the educational aspects of punishment prevail. The law-abiding groups have always
supplemented the formal repression of a crime
by an ostracism, which it would be hardly desirable to eliminate totally.

This is a special instance of the general problem of whether society can
afford in a special case to prosecute,
or whether it can afford not to
prosecute. This dilemma is uppermost in all legislation and still more
important in the practice of the
courts. Every formal and official prosecution adds to the social harm of the
criminal act the social damage of the
total or partial destruction of the personality of the perpetrator of this act,quite apart from the cost of his punishment to the community. If there is little
probability of chronic criminosity, or
of infectious propagation of this type
of behavior, prosecution may be unadvisable. On the other hand, infectious
crimes must be dealt with comprehensively. Whether a crime is infectious,
and to what extent an objective tyipe
of behavior is dangerous, depends only
to a minor 'extent on the objective behavior. To a greater extent it is conditioned by the "Gestalt" of the whole
situation, of which the objective behavior is only one detail. Much European legislation makes allowances for
such changes of seductive virulence by
supplementing a normally lenient type
of criminal statutes with provisions for
extraordinary measures. That means:
a general toleration may be revoked, if
a given type of crime spreads or
changes its importance through the
change of situation.
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Another instance of this differential
social reaction is to be found in the formation of vigilance committees. Punitive repression is only a supplementation
of suggestive regulative institutions,
neighborhood, church, family. Whenever these institutions fail, punitive reaction increases, either officially or unofficially: as well, because in such a
situation of social disequilibrium the
social consideration for the individual
members is at a minimum, as because
the infectiousness of criminal acts for
this very reason is at a maximum. In
certain cases, the opinion of minor
groups may differ from the opinions of
society at large: Lynching of negroes
is due to a disregard of the social value
of a negro's life, and at the same time
to an exaggerated appreciation of the
danger of the spreading of negro criminality. This dissenting reaction must
find expression in extrastatutory acts,
because it is expressly only by certain
groups, not by the society.
Failure of society to find the right
medium between lack-of vigilance and
exaggerated rigidity is one of the most
upsetting elements. Obvious "toleration" of objective criminal behavior
that has been generally outlawed by
society is very often the cause of revolutionary or pre-revolutionary attitudes.
Social reaction towards a given behavior is therefore always qualified by
sundry factors: by the social harm
done, by anticipation of its infectiousness, by a deliberation upon the cost
of prosecuting and the cost of notprosecuting, by the cost of applying
punitive measures, by the cost of inter-

fering with a personality of a given
social value. These deliberations find
sometimes expression in law and statutes, as qualifications and exemptions.
Sometimes they work subreptitiously.
But they always are present. They are
the cause of the failure of legislation
ever to succeed in eliminating the human subjective factor in social reactions of a formal nature.
But the true social distinctions are
based on other causes and expressed
in a different manner. It is the so called
"objective behavior," in which the
different types of "criminality" that are
characteristic of the different social
groups find expression, that is different.
As Hooton observed, the wish to gratify one's desires in socially prohibited
and undesirable ways, may be the same
with members of all classes. But except for a few very fundamental drives
that allow for expression only in a given
channel, the drives for self-assertion,
self-aggrandisement, forbidden gratification will find a very different objective expression under different environmental opportunities. Jack-rolling is
the adequate expression for the underprivileged. It would be ridiculously inadequate to gratify the white collar
man's desires for quick money. The type
of violent assault is different with the
gangster and with the courtiers of Louis
XIV. It is by no means true that society
shows uniformly a higher "Toleration
Quotient" for members of the privileged
classes, as Van Vechten's formula assumes. Society's differential reaction
pattern works both ways. But it is
seldom arbitrary. The history of the
repression of the duelling habit shows
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that. Of common practise in feudal
times, when everybody had to rely on
his own pluck, duelling is prohibited by
middle class moral and middle class
legislation, when the State is the general
common safeguard. But it remains obligatory for the body of officers and other
groups, whose social function is based
on personal courage. The pacifistic outlook of 1918 aims at a total repression.
But the reaction of 1933 brings a total
reestablishment. Certain undesirable
acts, connected with trade and acquisition of wealth, were likewise
handled when the acquisitive mentality
seemed the source of social welfare.
Political propaganda is a virtue in
democracies. European legislation before 1933 agreed in certifying to the
political criminal that he was not the
mean brand and ought to be handled
with velvet gloves, because the independence of political thinking seemed
necessary for appropriate progress, and
because therefore society resolved to
put up even with abuses. But it is a
deadly crime in totalitarian states.
Thus society adhibits Toleration,
when not extermination but modification of underlying drives is desirable.
Society and society's mores and legislation find many ways of effecting discriminate behavior reaction against behavior patterns, which seem to originate in mental attitudes that society
highly values at the given'time. Pareto
refers to the fact that society may at
times feel a scarcity of certain types of
61lite-representatives. In a time of war,
the strain on the military groups may
be excessive; the demand may exceed

the supply. This being so, who would
assume that society may prosecute with
cruelty the warlike and violent type of
man, and punish by repressive reactions
their typical criminality? "Then industry and commerce develop and the supply, though remaining the same, no
longer meets the demand." (The Mind
and Society, §2045.) Who would expect
at such times a reaction against -wite
collar crime which might tend to diminish the supply of white collar workers?
At a later period, when the supply
exceeds the demand, and when trade
and commerce are no more expanding,
the societal attitude must change. The
trading individual is no more so important for society. Thereby his transgressions become more harmful. As
the given class is subject to a harder
pressure by the transition to a less
favored social status, the propensity to
make up for this deterioration through
fast methods increases. And the result
will be that society will replace lenient
methods by harsh reactions.
It is up to social science to contribute
to a clear understanding when such a
change of attitude on the part of society
is desirable. Social science must understand the underlying mechanisms of reaction; it must deal with antisocial behavior irrespective of status and irrespective of legalistic differentiations.
White collar crime is only one instance
of a general phenomenon. But as we are
changing our evaluation of its meaning, it serves well to designate the underlying problems of criminology and
criminal psychology.

